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Wood v. Duff-Gordon and the Modernist
Cult of Personality
Megan Richardson* and David Tan**+
Lucy Duff-Gordon occupied the fringes of modernism, a
movement defined by a prominent group of radical writers, mu-
sicians and artists who reveled in the new century's atmosphere
of no formal constraints and constant reinventing. I But, while
those at modernism's centre may have been anti-bourgeois,
those at the fringes converted modernism's radical agenda to a
more bourgeois agenda of hard work, ingenuity and profit. 2 As
a fashion designer, Lucy incorporated modernist styles and mo-
tifs into her designs and sold them to a flourishing middle-class
market as examples of a modernist ideal of form (simple ele-
gance) following function (wearability).3 Her colourful, softly.
revealing, "personality" dresses broke with traditional dress-
styles of the nineteenth century and conveyed the new mood of
freedom and modernity. A gown, she said, must simply "ex-
press the wearer's taste and individuality."4 She embraced the
* Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne.
** PhD student, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne.
We are grateful to James Fishman for a great Symposium theme and to the
Symposium participants for some illuminating discussions. We also thank Jane
Ginsburg, Victor Goldberg, Dan Hunter and Sam Ricketson for helpful comments
and advice on information and ideas presented in this paper. For insights into
Lucile's work and reputation as a fashion designer we are indebted to Lourdes
Font, Rebecca Matheson, Lewis Orchard and Molly Sorkin.
1. The movement included, for instance, Expressionism, Dadaism, Surrealism
and Cubism-the last especially influential for fashion design. See RICHARD MAR-
TIN, CUBISM AND FASHION (1998).
2. Raymond Williams, a luminary source on the defining values and contra-
dictions of modernism, says this happened "quite rapidly." Raymond Williams,
When Was Modernism? 1/175 NEW LEFr REV. 48, 51 (1989).
3. See REBECCA MATHESON & MOLLY SORKIN, DESIGNING THE IT GIRL: LUCILE
AND HER STYLE 17 (The Museum at FIT, New York, 2005) ("Many of Lucile's de-
signs anticipated the simplicity of line and the active lifestyle of the later twenti-
eth century" and "Lucile's modernity was most evident in evening dresses and
teagowns that clung to the body, revealing slender, uncorseted figures. Lucile re-
lied on precise cut and drape of fabric to create her version of modern elegance.").
4. Lady Duff-Gordon, For the Theatre, HEARST'S SUNDAY AMERICAN, Mar. 4,
1917.
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efficient production techniques of an industrial age and adapted
them to her artistic-commercial ends. Her workshops were fac-
tories, by 1912 employing some 2,000 staff worldwide.5 And
there were constant border crossings as she moved between
London, New York, that "eponymous city of strangers,"6 and
Paris, the centre of fashion. 7 Portrayed as "the famous Lucile of
London,"8 her identity was really cosmopolitan and highly con-
structed. She created her identity, revealing herself through
her designs, writings and endorsements as the ultimate arbiter
of taste and style. 9 Her label was simply Lucile. Lucy was
Lucile, whose "favor helps a sale," as Justice Cardozo said in
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.10 "Dressed by Lucile" was "a
magic pass-word in drawing rooms everywhere."" "In her hey-
day, Lucile's artistry was unique, her influence enormous,"
Cecil Beaton observed. 12
This paper is about law's treatment of personality as a way
of selling fashion design. To an extent, we suggest, law re-
sponded sympathetically to the creativity, commercialism and
cosmopolitanism of the modernist fashion designers' world, es-
pecially in the metropolises of London, New York and Paris
which formed the shifting central focuses of their interlinked
lives. Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon13 and its lesser known com-
panion case, Poiret v. Jules Poiret Ltd. ,14 are perfect examples of
personality rights in early modern New York (in Lucy's case)
and London (in Poiret's). The cases show contracting parties
being supported, protected and held to contracts by which they
seek to exploit their personalities for commercial ends; and non-
contracting parties granted control over those with whom they
5. Randy Bryan Bigham, Madam Lucile: A Life in Style, Encyclopedia Titan-
ica, 2003, http://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/articles/lucile.pdf.
6. Williams, supra note 2, at 50.
7. Powerful, prosperous, populous and of international reputation, Paris was
undoubtedly the center of the luxury industries in the early twentieth century,
according to fashion writer and fashion historian Francois Baudot. FRANcois
BAUDOT, A CENTURY OF FASHION 30 (James Brenton trans., Thames & Hudson Ltd.
1999).
8. See Lady Duff-Gordon, supra note 4.
9. Bigham, supra note 5.
10. 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
11. Obituary of Lucy Duff-Gordon, THE TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1935, at 12.
12. CECIL BEATON, THE GLASS OF FASHION 33-34 (1954).
13. 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
14. (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177 (U.K.).
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might deal in exploiting their personalities, if they choose to
deal at all. Moreover, the protagonists' constant interplay be-
tween dealing and not dealing leads us to conclude that the gen-
esis of what were later to be called publicity rights15 may have
as much to do with these contemporary practices as with, as
sometimes suggested, the right to be "let alone.' 16
I. Lucile and her Advertising Agent
On September 21, 1916, Printer's Ink announced that Lucy
Duff-Gordon had entered into a contract with Sears Roebuck
and Company to sell dresses made to Lucy's designs through
the Sears catalogue. The venture was said to be "by far the
most spectacular bid for prestige which this daring advertiser
had made since it first announced the new handy edition of the
Encyclopedia Britannica."1 7 For Lucy's part, as reported in the
Ladies Home Journal (running an advertisement by Sears), her
"one dream [was] to make clothes for the women who have not
hundreds of dollars to spend on one frock" and the arrangement
with Sears would enable her "to design clothes for women who
have twenty-five or fifty dollars or ten to spend."8 This ar-
rangement was a remarkably modern example of exploitation of
a personality right-the "prestige" of the "Lucile" name en-
hanced the value of goods beyond the quality-guarantee which
came with Lucy's association with the design and manufactur-
15. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953); Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203
(1954) (citing Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 204 (1890)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49
(1995).
16. The latter was suggested especially by Nimmer, supra note 15, who takes
as his starting point from the classic article by Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 204 (1890), to argue that a right of
publicity is "the reverse side of the coin of privacy." See also J. Thomas McCarthy,
Melville B Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703,
1710 (1987) ("The modern view of the right of publicity is that it is an inherent
right of identity possessed by everyone at birth. The majority of modern courts
have followed Nimmer's approach .... ).
17. See Walter Pratt Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century,
39 S.C. L. REv. 415, 439 (1988) (quoting Sears-Roebuck's Latest Advertising Coup,
PRINTER'S INK, Sept. 21, 1916, at 28).
18. See Victor Goldberg, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon with Help
from the Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMING CONTRACT LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 56
(2006).
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ing process. 19 Her commitment that she would not only design
but would ensure "garments will be made up under my personal
supervision" only added to the personal character of her associ-
ation.20 While in the end the venture may have been considered
a failure for Sears, the fact that "Sears sold about $90,000
worth of Lucy's dresses in six months" 21 indicates the potential
for mass-production of fashion and also the potential to use a
highly personalized fashion label as a selling device.
Unfortunately for Lucy, the arrangement with Sears also
placed her in breach of her contract with her advertising agent,
Otis F. Wood, who had contracted to provide his services in
searching out endorsement opportunities in exchange for exclu-
sivity and a share of the profits of endorsements obtained. Ap-
parently, after the first year, Wood had failed to achieve much
by way of results.22 Whether he tried very hard is not clear. On
the one hand, he had earlier faced a claim for want of "best ef-
forts" from another client, Rose O'Neill, who entrusted him with
merchandising her popular Kewpie dolls. 23 On the other, Lucy's
defection could be seen as part of a general pattern of the 1910s
when "advertisers found it extremely difficult to prevent celeb-
rities from endorsing other products or abandoning their busi-
ness obligations outright . . .often working in league with an
agent who sought endorsement opportunities on their behalf,"
19. Such prestige value is now well-understood. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The
Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality,
39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1242-43 (1986) (the "economic associative value" that a
celebrity brings to a brand is the transfer of the perceived attributes of the celeb-
rity-for example, success, glamour, beauty and talent-directly to the brand he or
she is associated with); Grant McCracken, Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural
Foundations of the Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 310 (1989); Mary
Walker, Lynn Langmeyer & Daniel Langmeyer, Celebrity Endorsers: Do You Get
What You Pay For?, 9 J. CONSUMER MARK. 69 (1992). And, for associative value
understood in early advertising theory, see WALTER DILL SCOTT, THE THEORY OF
ADVERTISING: A SIMPLE EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY IN RELA-
TION TO SUCCESSFUL ADVERTISING ch. 3 (1904).
20. See Goldberg, supra note 18.
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id. at 56. Goldberg states that, according to Randy Bigham, Wood placed
a number of commercial endorsements in the first year of the contract, but then
"['things began to unravel in year two when Lucy bypassed Wood and directly en-
tered into a contract with Sears . . . ." Id.
23. Id. at 55 (the case did not proceed to trial after Wood failed in a procedural
motion).
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the practice here turned against the agent. 24 Her feeble and ul-
timately ineffectual defense to his suit for damages was want of
mutuality. There is a certain irony in her argument that a con-
tract that was supposed to provide her with the benefit of
Wood's "business organization adapted to the placing of such in-
dorsements [sic] as the said Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, has ap-
proved"25 was unenforceable-as much on her side, if it came to
it, as on his. The result of the dispute are well-known: the trial
court found Wood "obliged to exercise his 'bona fide judg-
ment,"' 26 the appellate division reversed on the basis that "the
defendant gives everything and the plaintiff nothing,"27 and the
court of appeals restored the trial court's decision on the basis
that the contract was "'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly
expressed"28 that Wood should provide "reasonable efforts."29
According to Walter Pratt Jr.:
The disagreement between the two lower New York courts pre-
cisely reflected the fluid state of contract doctrine at the turn of
the century. Poised between the traditional rule of the appellate
division and the modern rule of the trial court, judges throughout
the country strove to articulate values in response to the new con-
tractual devices. The 'open' nature of the contract between Lucy
and Wood challenged the venerated rule of contract law that there
could be no contract unless the obligations of the parties were
mutual.30
In fact, as Pratt acknowledges, the modern rule was a
mainly New York rule. 31 New York's industries and practices
were rapidly developing and with this came uncertainty, re-
flected in open contract terms. Some of its new industries were
by their nature uncertain. The advertising industry, which de-
24. Marlis Schweitzer, The Mad Search for Beauty: Actresses' Testimonials,
the Cosmetics Industry, and the "Democratization of Beauty," 4 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGREssrvE ERA 255, 276 (2005).
25. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 222 (N.Y. 1917).
26. See Pratt, supra note 17, at 440.
27. Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 164 N.Y.S. 576, 577 (App. Div. 1917).
28. Wood, 118 N.E. at 222 (citing McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775 (App.
Div. 1909); Moran v Standard Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914)).
29. Id.
30. Pratt, supra note 17, at 440.
31. Id. at 448-49 ("Significant statements of the new doctrine came from New
York .... ).
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pended upon emotion rather than "rationality" for success, 32
was one of these, and perhaps it was thought that, if such in-
dustries were to flourish, New York courts needed to "respond
to the demands of practical convenience." 33 It took a while for
the modern rule to catch on in the rest of America. Samuel Wil-
liston gave Wood v. Duff-Gordon a narrow reading in his 1920
treatise on The Law of Contracts, viz "the promise of either
party may be optional, if the exercise of the option not to employ
or to serve involves a detriment to the promisee, or benefit to
the promisor."34 But in his more New York focused Principles of
Law of Contract,3 5 William Richardson saw its broader lasting
implications: "[t]he promises need not necessarily be expressed.
One may be expressed and the other implied from the particu-
lar circumstances of the case." 36 This was to be the perfect ap-
proach for personal endorsement contracts, where open contract
terms-express as well as implied-were a direct result of par-
ties' inabilities to predict the level of public demand for en-
dorsed products.37
It is noteworthy that the modern rule of Wood v. Duff-
Gordon was stated in a case concerned with the commercial ex-
ploitation of personality. Commercial personality interests fea-
tured in other cases as well. A particular example is the 1919
English case of Hepworth Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Ry-
ott.38 Ryott was an actor who had become a star of silent films,
his fame second to Charlie Chaplin in a national newspaper
poll.39 His contract with his employer was open in stating that
32. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1165-66 (1948) (modem advertising employs
"threats, cajolery, emotions, personality, persistence"). See also PoYNT-z TYLER, AD-
VERTISING IN AMERICA (1959).
33. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-99
(1921) (the rule in Wood v. Duff-Gordon responded to "the demands of practical
convenience").
34. SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 219 (1920).
35. WILLIAM RICHARDSON, RowE's COMMERCIAL LAW (2nd ed. 1920) (William
Richardson served as the Dean of Brooklyn Law School).
36. Id. at 178.
37. See Pratt, supra note 17, at 432 (characterizing the contract between
Wood and Lucy).
38. Hepworth Mfg. Co. v. Ryott, (1919) 1919 WL 13690 (Austl.).
39. Id. at *7-9. See also Obituary of Wernham Ryott, THE TIMES, Mar. 2,
1965, at 14 (stating that "with sentimental eyes and strong jaw," Rome was "more
or less the prototype of today's cinema star").
[Vol. 28:379
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if he were advertised it would be under his stage name Stewart
Rome. But there was no question as to mutuality or certainty of
the contract, Judge Astbury pointing out that film producers
had obvious interests in advertising their "star performers."40
Rather, the covenant giving Hepworth control of the Stewart
Rome name was held unenforceable as a restraint of trade, be-
ing both "injurious" and "oppressive" in appropriating a name
that had become "merged . . . in the identity of another per-
son."4 1 In Hepworth, the court showed an early appreciation of
the special value that lies in a star's image once it is merged in
the identity of a person, incorporating a human quality (which,
as Richard Dyer says, is the star's appeal),42 but also introduced
a note of personal vulnerability regarding its use. A few months
later the implications of acknowledging the combination of com-
mercial and human interests that lie in the protection of a star's
image would be more thoroughly tested in Poiret v. Jules Poiret,
Ltd.
II. Poiret's War on Piracy
When Lucy Duff-Gordon's major business rival, Paul
Poiret,43 returned from the War and resumed work as a fashion
designer in Paris, he found that the Poiret name had been used
by Alexander Nash, a former actor, to conduct a fashion busi-
ness in London since 1914. By the time proceedings for passing
off were launched in London Nash's company, Jules Poiret Ltd.,
had developed a "very high reputation, especially for costumes
40. Hepworth Mfg. Co., 1919 WL 13690, at * 7 (noting that stars were of "first-
rate importance" as between rival producers).
41. Id. at *13-15. See also id. at *25 (Warrington, L.J.) ("I am glad to think
that by our decision that object [to bind a particular actor to a particular employer]
will probably be defeated."); Id. at *32 (Atkin, L.J.); Id. at * 34 (Eve, J.). The fact
that Ryott was being paid an artisan's wage of £10 a week under the contract was
clearly a factor in the decision. See id. at *9-10 (Ryott compelled to accept less
than market value).
42. RicHARD DYER, STARS 20 (2nd ed., with supplementary chapter by Paul
McDonald, 1998). See also ELLIS CASHMORE, CELEBRITY/CULTURE 165-87 (2006);
HAMIsH PRINGLE, CELEBRITY SELLS 51-74, 94-103 (2004).
43. Poiret has been credited with creating "the first dresses that could be put
on without assistance," narrowing the silhouette, and forging "the way forward for
all his successors." See FRANcois BAUDOT, POIRET 12 (Caroline Beamish trns.,
Thames & Hudson 1997). See also Nancy Troy, Poiret's Modernism and the Logic
of Fashion, in HAROLD KODA & ANDREW BOLTON, POIRET (2007).
2008] 385
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
for theatrical productions."44 Paul Poiret argued that the Poiret
name contributed to this success but at the cost of his own repu-
tation with the English public which had long associated the
famous Poiret name with fashion design-to the English public
a "Poiret" gown meant "a dress designed or made by Paul Poiret
of Paris."45 Nash argued that French names were "usual" in the
fashion trade, 46 that without a local place of business, Poiret
was not entitled to protect the reputation associated with his
name and that any business activity in England had ceased in
1914 when the Paris fashion house closed. P.O. Lawrence J. re-
jected these arguments, commenting that:
The Defendant Nash seems to consider that because Paul Poiret
has no place of business in London, he is not entitled to protect his
reputation in business in this country, and that he, the Defendant
Nash, is at liberty to take the name of 'Poiret' and use it in respect
of his goods in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs goods are known
in the English market as 'Poiret' gowns and 'Poiret' creations. In
my opinion this view is entirely mistaken. Paul Poiret is, in my
judgment, in the circumstances of this case entitled to protect his
goods and the reputation he has acquired in this country. .... 47
Interestingly, there were indications of at least local busi-
ness activity in Poiret, but they were sketchy and incomplete.
Dealings with private clients and theatres and an exhibition of
gowns at Number 10 Downing Street were mentioned. 48 Poiret
also gave evidence of pre-war wholesale customers whose repre-
sentatives would "come to Paris and purchase my models and
designs, which they can reproduce and sell" with "no condi-
tions."49 In fact, sales and reproductions were happening on a
reasonably wide scale-for instance, it was not uncommon from
1910 to 1914 to see advertisements in The Times from London
department stores such as Debenham & Freebody promoting
44. Poiret v. Jules Poiret Ltd., (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177, 181 (U.K.).
45. Id. at 182.
46. THE TIMES, July 10, 1920, at 5.
47. Poiret, (1920) 37 R.P.C. at 187.
48. Id. at 183-84.
49. THE TIMES, July 8, 1920, at 5. Andrew Bolton comments that this was
common practice for couturiers and "[often these foreign buyers paid a special
price for the gowns that included the right to make and market multiple copies."
Andrew Bolton, Response to Multiple, Movement, Model, Mode, in FASHION AND
MODERNITY 149 (Christopher Breward & Caroline Evans eds., 2005).
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Poiret gowns at marked down prices as well as their own
"scarcely distinguishable" copies made "by our own workers
from high grade materials."50 We might wonder why Poiret did
not mention this in court. Nancy Troy says that Poiret consist-
ently sought to portray himself as an artist and feared this im-
age might be undermined by references to multiple sales. 51 He
may also have thought his reputation in England as a French
couturier should be sufficient for its protection when his coutu-
rier trade had fallen off with the war. In any event, reputation
was considered sufficient by P.O. Lawrence J. who condoned the
(literally false) idea that "a Poiret gown, or a Poiret creation,
meant a dress designed, or manufactured, by Paul Poiret."52 It
was only sixty years later, in a case involving the French res-
taurant Maxim's,53 that reputation was so wholeheartedly pro-
tected by an English court.54
The recognition of Poiret's cosmopolitan reputation as tran-
scending business presence and activity finds parallels in the
treatment of damage. P.O. Lawrence J. said Poiret should not
have to "submit to the confusion and deception and damage"
which would arise if Nash continued to trade under the Poiret
name "now that it has again become possible for Paul Poiret to
place his goods on the English market."55 The precise nature of
the damage when parties were trading at different ends of the
market-Poiret's dresses said to be "very expensive" and exclu-
50. See Debenham & Freebody, Display Advertising, THE TIMES, Oct. 19,
1910, at 11; see also THE TIMES, May 3, 1913, at 11. The copies were sold for about
half the price of the sale price of the originals. Compare, for instance, the 1910
advertisement (a "copy" of a Poiret tea gown priced at 61h gns) and Whitely's sale
price for a similar garment (model wrap, advertised as "by" Paul Poiret, "no two
alike," priced at £12, "less than half cost price") in Whiteley's, display advertising.
THE TiMEs, Jan. 15, 1912, at 10. Debenham & Freebody also advertised original
Poiret lines for similar prices. See Display Advertising, THE TIMES, July 8, 1911, at
13 ("Paul Poiret" coat and skirt advertised on sale for 121h gns, marked down from
£40).
51. See NANcy TROY, COUTURE CULTURE: A STUDY IN MODERN ART AND FASH-
ION 302 (2002) (arguing the dilemma for Poiret was resolving "the contradiction
between art and industry").
52. Poiret v. Jules Poiret Ltd., (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177, 185 (U.K.).
53. Maxim's Ltd. v. Dye, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1155 (Eng.). Cf Globe Elegance BV
v. Sarkissian, [19741 R.P.C. 603 (Eng.) (Valentino).
54. Conagra, Inc. v. McCain Foods, (1992) 22 I.P.R. 193, 203-19 (Austl.) (Lock-
hart, J.) (adding that later the position in the United Kingdom became less clear
on the sufficiency of reputation).
55. Poiret, (1920) 37 R.P.C. at 188.
20081
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sive, Nash's less so 6-was not spelt out. Nor was it explained
in contemporary cases in which courts oversaw the expansion of
passing off and like doctrines to a plaintiff and defendant trad-
ing in even more different fields of activity. For instance, the
American Vogue cases, Vogue Co. v. Bretano's5 7 and Vogue Co.
v. Thompson-Hudson Co.,58 had remarkably little discussion of
the nature of damage flowing from unauthorized use of style-
synonymous Vogue trade marks for fashion plates and hats (the
magazine not in the business of selling either), although it was
accepted that unfair competition, the "convenient name for the
doctrine that no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those
of another," is not dependent upon actual "market competi-
tion."5 9 A few years later, Frank Schechter was to argue that
damage in such cases is "the gradual whittling away or disper-
sion of the identity or hold on the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods." 60 But Poiret may
have had a more particular concern in bringing an action
against Nash. On a trip to America in September 1913 he had
observed uncontrolled copying of his designs, with many of the
copies sold under Poiret labels. 61 His response was a flurry of
letters and advertisements, warning against "false labels," de-
manding an end to "pirating of fashion," which threatened the
Paris dress-makers, and announcing policies of "prosecuting to
the full extent of the law" and generally using all methods at his
disposal to prevent wholesalers and others from engaging in
56. Id. at 194 ("Paul Poiret's dresses were very expensive, and the class who
bought them a limited class .... The Defendant's business is the largest or one of
the largest in London."). We might speculate as to whether he meant the largest
in clothing generally or rather in theatrical costumes-the second perhaps more
likely than the first, given this was his main line of business.
57. 261 F. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
58. 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
59. See Brentano's, 261 F. at 421; Thompson-Hudson, 300 F. at 512. In
Thompson-Hudson a separate "technical" trademark claim failed because of the
different goods, the court assuming, without deciding, that was a sufficient bar.
Id. It was also thought that "Vogue" was too descriptive to function as a trade-
mark and that a "forceful secondary meaning" had not been established (the unfair
competition claim succeeding on the basis of the distinctiveness of the "V" and "V-
girl" trademarks). Id. Interestingly, a different view was taken on the latter issue
in Vogue Co. v. Bretano's. Brentano's, 261 F. at 421.
60. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv.
L. REV. 813, 825 (1926) (rejecting the rationale sometimes suggested in the cases
that the harm came from the fact of trade in related fields of activity).
61. See TROY, supra note 51, at 232 (detailing the visit and its aftermath).
388 [Vol. 28.:379
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and supporting (non-authorized) copying.62 The experience sug-
gests that, by the time of the proceedings in Poiret v. Jules
Poiret Ltd., Poiret's desire was to control the market for Poiret
labels, which Jules Poiret Ltd. was busily exploiting, and this
was seen as imperative from both a business and personal point
of view. The reasoning resonates with P.O. Lawrence J's refer-
ence to Poiret's injury from the passing off as found in his forced
submission to confusion, deception and (thus) damage.63
Reference to forced submission anticipated the way English
and American courts later would adapt language of damage in
passing off to accommodate unauthorized commercial use of
personality. Damage came to be couched in terms of loss of "the
ability to decide who, if anyone, can use . . . [his reputation]
alongside him,"64 the right to "withhold or bestow at will" a
"professional recommendation, ' 65 to permit or refuse to permit
another to borrow reputation and exploit it "as the symbol of its
possessor and creator."66 It is a small step from there to see the
ability to contract effectively about personal endorsements,
which lay at the heart of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, as
the other side of the coin from the right to deny an endorse-
ment, upheld in Poiret v. Jules Poiret, Ltd.
Indeed, the close nexus between contracting and the right
to deny must have been evident to the determined artist-entre-
62. See Warning Against False Labels, in TRoy, supra note 52 at 237; To Stop
Pirating of Dress Fashions: Paul Poiret Heading a Movement Among Leading Paris
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1914, at 4. In the New York Times advertisement
Poiret's broader concern was copying of designs not just false labeling practices
(although fashion piracy, without fraud or deceit, was notoriously difficult to ad-
dress under United States law). See Montegut v. Hickson, 178 A.D. 94 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1917); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
63. Poiret v. Jules Poiret Ltd., (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177, 188 (U.K.).
64. Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002] 2 All E.R. 414, 425 (U.K.), affd, [2003] 2
All E.R. 881 (U.K.) (racing driver's name promoting a radio station). Although the
judge did not distinguish personal and merely commercial reputation the language
suggests he had personal reputation in mind. Id.
65. Henderson v. Radio Corp. Pty. Ltd., (1969) 1A I.P.R. 620, 638 (Austl.) (the
ballroom dancers' case). The full Supreme Court of New South Wales rejected the
authority of the English case McCulloch v. Lewis A. May, (1947) 65 R.P.C. 58
(Eng.), that a common field of activity, however remote, must exist before a pass-
ing off could be found. The New South Wales court's reasoning was preferred in
Irvine v. Talksport Ltd. See Irvine, [20021 2 All E.R. 414.
66. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (talking
about dealings "with a proper name" shown "to denote the defendant when applied
to flash-lights").
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preneur in the teens and twenties. Passing off, unfair competi-
tion, trade mark registrations, privacy (and in New York the
statutory right of the individual to claim false endorsement)
were certainly common weapons against pirates. 67 These
seemed more effective than corrective advertising when labels
were fraudulently used-although Poiret tried this as well,6 as
did Lucy Duff-Gordon when dresses that were not designed by
her were falsely advertised in New York.69 But Poiret, even
more than Lucy, showed how the persuasive methods of con-
tract might be used in tandem to exercise control over use of a
celebrity fashion designer's image as a selling device. Poiret's
pre-war arrangements with wholesalers, who gained freedom to
copy with purchase of the original, were very loose arrange-
ments by today's standards. However, according to Francois
Baudot, the arrangements were recast after his American visit
so that "[olnly firms agreeing to sell his models could use the
Poiret label and royalties would be paid for each model repro-
duced."70 He also sold perfumes and furnishings under his
daughters' names, an early (successful) effort at brand exten-
sion. 71 And he even had a brief experiment with ready-to-wear.
In October 1916, a month after Lucy's announced deal with
Sears (which incidentally had been following Lucile's styles for
years),72 Vogue carried Poiret's advertisement for a collection of
affordable suits, coats, wraps, skirts, evening and afternoon
gowns designed by him for "the women of America" and made
under special license by the Max Grab Fashion Company in
New York.73 In ready-to-wear, Poiret's designs were produced
67. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) (unfair
competition); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div.
1920); Harris v. H.W. Gossard Co., 185 N.Y.S. 861 (App. Div. 1921) (although only
six cents in damages were awarded because the claimant actress had consented to
similar uses). See also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga.
1905) (privacy).
68. See Warning Against False Labels, in TROY, supra note 51, at 237.
69. See Lady Duff-Gordon's Bankruptcy, THE TIMES, Feb. 15, 1923 at 5.
70. BAUDOT, supra note 7, at 13.
71. See id. at 9-11 (Rosine perfume label and Martine decorative arts, the lat-
ter sold in department stores).
72. See Introduction to EVERYDAY FASHION: 1909-1920 As PICTURED IN SEARS
CATALOGS (JoAnne Olian ed., Dover Publications 1995) ("Nineteen fourteen
showed the marked influence of Irene Castle, Lucile and the reigning French cou-
turier, Paul Poiret").
73. See TROY, supra note 51, at 303 (copy of Poiret's advertisement in VOGUE).
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for the mass-market in direct competition with the pirates. Per-
haps resort to intellectual property protection was thought in-
adequate to prevent mass-copying, given it was happening on
such a wide-scale. And, as Andrew Bolton says, "[i]llegal piracy
made it difficult for couturiers to charge high prices based on
the rarity of their designs because copies were widely available
at much reduced prices."74 On the other hand, the popularity of
the mass-produced items may have shown couturiers an untap-
ped market, where it made sense to use contract, share profit,
exercise control over production and quality, and claim authen-
ticity-Poiret's garments labeled "genuine reproductions"-a
modernist's attempt to privilege his personally approved copies
over the pirated versions.75
Poiret's ready-to-wear fashion line was abandoned after the
war.76 But his steps into mass-production, like Lucy Duff-
Gordon's, set the path for the "Ford" of the fashion design world,
Coco Chanel with her eminently copyable "little black dress"
and her lucrative Chanel No 5 perfume. 77 Later, after the next
war, endorsement practices fractured. Fashion designers be-
came more famous. Their fame started to be used to "sell" prod-
ucts solely on account of fame. 78 Their labels were applied not
just to dresses, perfumes and home furnishings (although such
uses obviously continued), but to restaurants (as with Maxim's
74. Bolton, supra note 49, at 149.
75. See TROY, supra note 51, at 303 (copy of Poiret's advertisement in VOGUE).
76. Troy suggests that Poiret later saw the experiment as a failure and
"quickly reverted to ways in which he had always privileged originality." Id. at
312; but see Bolton, supra note 49, at 150 (a practical option).
77. See Nancy Troy, Chanel's Modernity, in HAROLD KODA & ANDREW BOLTON,
CHANEL 19, 20-21 (2005).
78. Reaching a high point with Pierre Cardin who in 2003 was endorsing
"more than 900 products-from olive oil to frying pans, floor tiles, sardines, and
orthopaedic mattresses-in more than 140 countries." Jamie Huckbody, Pierre
Cardin: He's Everywhere, THE AGE, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.theage.com.au/arti-
cles/2003/08/01/1059480531338.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). See also RICHARD
MoRAIs, CARDIN: THE MAN WHO BECAME A LABEL (1991). Gianni Versace is an-
other example of an endorser. See Reka Buckley & Stephen Gundle, Flash Trash:
Gianni Versace and the Theory and Practice of Glamour in Stella Bruzzi & Pamela
Church Gibson, Fashion Cultures (2000). By contrast, Giorgio Armani has main-
tained tighter control over licensing and often exercised creative control over prod-
ucts. See, e.g., Giorgio Armani Beauty Homepage, http://www.giorgioarmani
beauty.comlindex.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (beauty products); Giorgio
Armani Casa Homepage, http://www.armanicasa.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2008)
(home furnishings).
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by Pierre Cardin), jet planes (Versace), mobile phones (for in-
stance, Prada and Dolce & Gabbana) and more. 79 Intellectual
property rights expanded in support.80 At the same time, in cul-
tural studies circles, questions were being asked about the
star's image, some suggesting it was wholly constructed and
had nothing to do with the person or products over which it was
used.81 Such questions were to pose an even greater challenge
to the star's control over "personality" than the artists' manage-
able challenge of merging art and industry in the machine age,
or the judges' manageable challenge of adapting laws to allow
them to do so.
III. Legal Modernism
While privacy, framed simply as the right to be "let alone"
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890,82 might have
reflected the mood of the fin de sicle, by 1920 it appears to have
been largely superseded by a more sophisticated understanding
of personality, exemplified in the practices and legal disputes of
celebrity fashion designers Lucy Duff-Gordon and Paul Poiret.
As argued in this paper, their attitudes towards image as some-
thing to be cultivated and controlled for commercial and per-
sonal ends influenced their conduct and the responses of judges
in the cases which tested out the implications of their modernist
79. See Maxim's de Paris Homepage, http://www.maxims-de-paris.com/p2us.
htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Cardin and Maxim's); Versace Homepage, http:ll
www.versace.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Versace); Prada Phone by LG
Homepage, http://www.pradaphonebylg.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Prada);
Motorola Dolce & Gabbana Phone, http://www.store.motorola.com/mot/en/US/
adirect/motorola?cmd=catDisplayStyle (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Dolce &
Gabbana).
80. In particular, there was a rise of trade mark and publicity rights in the
United States and the expansion of passing off in the United Kingdom (and Aus-
tralia). See supra note 65 & 66; David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the
Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural Studies, 25 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J.
913 (2008).
81. Beginning with Daniel Boorstin's famous statement: "A celebrity is a per-
son who is known for his well-knownness .... He is the human pseudo-event."
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PsEuDo-EvENTs IN AMERICA 57
(1961). See also Dyer who (in typical postmodernist fashion) characterized the im-
age, or rather multiple images, of the star as "produced images, constructed per-
sonalities." DYER, supra note 42, at 20. For various implications of the reasoning,
found in later 'schools' of cultural studies, see Tan, supra note 80.
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16.
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ideas-in Wood v. Duff-Gordon, endorsing Lucy's initial, albeit
not ultimate, desire to cede partial control of her image to her
advertising agent and in Poiret v. Jules Poiret Ltd., supporting
Poiret's right to control sales of gowns under his personal label.
In both cases judicial language of freedom and control captured
the mood of an era in which material and personal well-being
were seen to depend on the creative talents, entrepreneurship
and above all personality of the individual.
Perhaps it is not surprising that judges responded to the
modernist mood of the early twentieth century. They were be-
coming more modern in their outlook including in their outlook
on the law as, to an extent, a product of the commercial, social
and intellectual environment. In January 1917 Arthur Corbin
had already announced, in legal realist fashion, that legal deci-
sions may "depend upon the notions of the court as to policy,
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions often being inar-
ticulate and subconscious."8 3 But such notions were far from in-
articulate and subconscious in Wood v. Duff-Gordon, where
Judge Cardozo said, "[tlhe law has outgrown its primitive stage
of formalism."8 4 Nor were they inarticulate and subconscious in
Hepworth v. Ryott, noted in the Law Quarterly Review for its
refreshingly "vigorous" language.85 They may have been more
muted in P.O. Lawrence J's judgment in Poiret v. Jules Poiret
Ltd., although the descriptions there of Poiret's couturier busi-
ness show a fine awareness of the commercial environment.
But they were rather well expressed by Judge Denison in Vogue
Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., who said, "[t]he invocation of eq-
uity" rests vitally on "unfairness" ("unfairness" a code word for
Corbin's "notions of the court").86 In this paper we have sug-
gested that law adapted in multiple ways to the impulses which
shaped the modern fashion industry. In reality, we have done
little more than draw on the words of judges whose insights into
the world of fashion and stars, like fashion itself, "blaze [d] for a
while before gradually dying out."87
83. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L. J. 169, 206 (1917).
84. Wood v. Lucy Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
85. Case Comments, 36 L.Q. REV. 101 (1920).
86. Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
87. BAUDOT, supra note 7, at 8.
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